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Clarifying Goals, Revitalizing Means: An Independent Evaluation of the
Freedom Online Coalition
Abstract
This independent evaluation of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) was commissioned by the Coalition as
it approaches its fifth anniversary. The FOC sought input into a wider strategic review they are carrying out to
assess its effectiveness with a particular focus on four areas – membership, governance and structure, the
Coalition’s efforts and activities, and funding.
Thirty interviews with government representatives, members of civil society, business representatives, and
academics were conducted between September 2015 and January 2016, along with an in-person consultation
with 14 stakeholders at the Internet Governance Forum in Brazil in November 2015. Desk research on five
similar types of organizations was used for comparative purposes.
The findings of this research show that there is significant support for the existence of the Coalition and for it
continuation as a government only coalition. However, there are a number of criticisms of the FOC, including
the lack of transparency about its activities, inadequate consequences for countries not meeting their
commitments, and frustration at the ambiguity of the aims and objectives of the Coalition, and the few
tangible results that have been produced so far. A number of respondents also talked about the ways in which
the Snowden revelations have complicated efforts to work on Internet freedom. There are specific
recommendations in each of the four areas covered in the evaluation, but the highest priority suggestions for
the Coalition moving forward are as follows:
• Clarify the aims and objectives of the Coalition;
• Increase the legitimacy of the Coalition by establishing a mechanism through which stakeholders can
raise concerns about the actions of a member government;
• Institute a mechanism whereby members’ performance at meeting their commitments can be
periodically reviewed;
• Establish more stable funding for the Coalition through the introduction of multi-year commitments
and a tiered funding model;
• Create a formal link between the working groups and the FOC’s governance in order to ensure that
outputs from the working groups are considered and responded to by the FOC;
• Improve the Coalition’s communication, clarifying membership criteria and rendering more
transparent, to the extent possible, its diplomatic interventions.
The Coalition is still a young institution and some of the issues it faces are a reflection of this. However, there
are areas that the FOC must address to increase its effectiveness. Ultimately, the question for the Coalition is
whether it can rise to the challenge of leading the global conversations that will drive action and policy making
on Internet freedom in an increasingly complex world.
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Executive Summary
As the Freedom Online Coalition approaches its five 
year anniversary, it commissioned this research to re-
view the cumulative work of the Coalition, assess its 
effectiveness and specifically get feedback on four key 
areas – membership, governance and structure, the 
Coalition’s efforts and activities, and funding.
Thirty interviews with government representatives, 
members of civil society, business representatives, and 
academics were conducted between September 2015 
and January 2016, along with an in-person consultation 
with 14 stakeholders in Brazil in November 2015.  Desk 
research was also conducted on five similar types of 
organizations for comparative purposes. 
The findings of this research show that there is signifi-
cant support for the existence of the Coalition and for 
it continuing as a government only coalition. However, 
there are also a number of criticisms of the FOC, in-
cluding the lack of transparency about its activities, 
inadequate consequences for countries not meeting 
their commitments, and frustration at the ambiguity of 
the aims and objectives of the Coalition and the few 
tangible results that have been produced so far.  A 
number of respondents also talked about the ways in 
which the Snowden revelations have complicated ef-
forts to work on Internet freedom.  There are specific 
recommendations in each of the four areas covered in 
the evaluation, but the highest priority suggestions for 
the Coalition moving forward are as follows:
• Clarify the aims and objectives of the Coalition;
• Increase the legitimacy of the Coalition by estab-
lishing a mechanism through which stakeholders 
can raise concerns about the actions of a mem-
ber government;
• Institute a mechanism whereby members’ per-
formance at meeting their commitments can be 
periodically reviewed; 
• Establish more stable funding for the Coalition 
through the introduction of multi-year commit-
ments and a tiered funding model;
• Create a formal link between the working groups 
and the FOC’s governance in order to ensure that 
outputs from the working groups are considered 
and responded to by the FOC;
• Improve the Coalition’s communication, clari-
fying membership criteria and rendering more 
transparent, to the extent possible, its diplomatic 
interventions.
The Coalition is still a young institution and some of 
the stumbling blocks it faces are a reflection of this. 
However, there are issues that the FOC must address 
to increase its effectiveness. Ultimately, the question 
for the Coalition is whether it can rise to the challenge 
of leading the global conversations that will drive action 
and policy making on Internet freedom in an increas-
ingly complex world. 
Page 5
MAY 2016                                                                                                                               AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE FREEDOM ONLINE COALITION
Introduction
Launched in 2011 in The Hague soon after the revolu-
tion in Tunisia and political upheaval across the Middle 
East, the Freedom Online Coalition was first formed as 
a loose Coalition of 15 countries working to advance 
Internet Freedom.1  At its foundation is the principle that 
offline human rights ought to apply online and that a 
free and open Internet is in service of human rights and 
contributes to development and economic growth. The 
Tallinn declaration several years later added further 
detail to the focus and commitments of the Coalition.2 
The website of the Coalition has more information 
about its work.3  
The landscape of Internet freedom has evolved dra-
matically since 2011 and the Coalition has itself 
undergone considerable expansion and development 
since its formation. It now has 29 members (see Annex 
A for a full list of members) and has established work-
ing groups on specific aspects of Internet freedom that 
include members of civil society, industry representa-
tives and academics. 
The FOC’s primary efforts in its first couple of years 
were hosting an annual Internet Freedom conference 
and the creation of the Digital Defenders Partnership, 
a fund for individuals and organizations working to 
defend a free and open Internet who may have found 
themselves at risk. In 2013, three working groups were 
established that brought that brought other stakehold-
ers (civil society, business, and academics) to the 
FOC’s table.4 
The day-to-day activity of the Coalition is led by the 
Coalition Chair, who rotates on an annual basis. The 
Chair also hosts the annual conference in their country 
1 Freedom Online: Joint Action for Free Expression on 
the Internet, Publication, February 2013, https://www.
freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1-The-
Hague-FOC-Founding-Declaration-with-Signatories-as-of-2013.
pdf.
2 Ministers of the Freedom Online Coalition, Recommendations 
for Freedom Online, Publication, April 28, 2014, https://www.
freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FOC-
recommendations-consensus.pdf
3 Freedom Online Coalition, last modified April 2016, https://www.
freedomonlinecoalition.com/
4 Working group 1 – A free and secure Internet; Working group 2 
- Digital development and openness; Working group 3 – Privacy 
and transparency online
and is supported by the Friends of the Chair, a group 
of the most involved countries in the Coalition, includ-
ing the previous Chair. The Coalition is supported by 
an external Secretariat that provides coordination, ad-
ministrative support and acts as a point of contact for 
anyone wanting to know more about the Coalition. 
In the last five years, the broader Internet freedom and 
Internet governance agendas have developed sig-
nificantly. Before this, the Tunis Agenda that emerged 
from the 2003 Geneva World Summit on the Informa-
tion Society (WSIS) and 2005 WSIS in Tunis led to the 
creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The 
IGF brings together several thousand stakeholders 
from civil society, business, academia and the techni-
cal community at an annual week-long event to discuss 
public policy issues relating to the Internet.  A number 
of regional and national IGFs have been created to 
continue those discussions at a more local level.5 
In the years since the Arab Spring, which jettisoned 
concerns about free expression and privacy to the top 
of the global agenda, the topic of online human rights 
has been a prominent feature at the IGF. Following the 
resolution passed at the Human Rights Council in 2012 
that the same rights that apply offline also apply online, 
there have been a number of reports produced by the 
UN in the last few years focused on issues related to 
Internet freedom and human rights.6 The first was by 
Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Pro-
motion and Protection of Freedom of Expression and 
Opinion.7 The following year saw “The Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age” published, which led to the creation 
of the first Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy.8 
In 2015, David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
5 “IGF Initiatives,” Internet Governance Forum, last modified 
2016, http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-initiatives. 
6 United Nations, Human Rights Council, 20/8. The Promotion, 
Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, 
Geneva: United Nations, 2012, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/
dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8
7 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, By Frank LaRue, Geneva: 
United Nations, 2011, how to http://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.
HRC.23.40_EN.pdf. 
8 United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Geneva: United 
Nations, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Regu-
larSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf.
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the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Expres-
sion and Opinion, produced a report on encryption that 
explored whether or not free expression and privacy 
rights protect secured communication using encryption 
and anonymity and the extent to which governments 
can impose restrictions.9
The 2013 Snowden revelations about the surveillance 
activities of the National Security Agency in the US 
and Government Communications Headquarters in the 
UK rocked Internet policy communities worldwide and 
shone a spotlight on the activities of liberal democra-
cies as well as repressive states. 
A number of organizations have emerged in recent 
years that concentrate on these issues, for example the 
Global Network Initiative, which brings tech companies 
together with human rights organizations, investors 
and academics. Established organizations such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, AccessNow, Bytes for All, the Centre for 
Internet and Society, Derechos Digitales and Privacy 
International are either fully focused on these issues 
or have incorporated them into their work. Many foun-
dations that fund civil society work are increasingly 
9 David Kaye, “Report on Encryption, Anonymity, and the Human 
Rights Framework,” The Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, 2015. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/CallForSubmission.aspx. 
developing specific digital rights programs including 
HIVOS, which runs the Digital Defenders Partnership 
launched by the FOC. 
Within this landscape, the FOC is uniquely a govern-
ment-only coalition focused on Internet freedom. This 
gives it the opportunity to advance the cause of Internet 
freedom through diplomatic interventions and its Digital 
Defenders Partnership as well as facilitating commu-
nication and contact between governments and other 
stakeholders within the working groups.   
The Freedom Online Coalition commissioned this inde-
pendent evaluation as it approaches the fifth year since 
its launch, with the intention of assessing the work of 
the Coalition to date, getting feedback from stake-
holders, and seeking recommendations to increase 
the FOC’s future effectiveness. There was particular 
interest in four areas – membership of the FOC, the 
governance and structure of the FOC, feedback on the 
importance of the current activities of the Coalition, and 
funding. This report will feed into a wider review of the 
FOC’s work that is being run by a working group within 
the Coalition.  The recommendations in this report are 
a combination of those that come from the author, as 
well as those that came from synthesizing interviewee 
and consultation responses. 
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The research for this evaluation was carried out during 
September 2015 to January 2016 using a combina-
tion of in-person and phone interviews, an in-person 
consultation at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 
in João Pessoa, Brazil in November 2015, and desk 
research. 
Two interview questionnaires, one for government 
members and one for all other stakeholders, were de-
signed to extract feedback from respondents about the 
four key areas of the evaluation – membership of the 
Coalition, the governance and structure of the FOC, 
the current focus of activities of the FOC, and funding. 
The questionnaire for government members included 
a greater degree of detail, reflecting the fact that they 
are more closely involved in the day-to-day work of the 
FOC.  Opinions were also sought about sought about 
Coalition successes thus far, challenges and opportu-
nities that the Coalition faces and what what benefits 
people see from working with or being part of the Co-
alition. 
The desk research was designed to complement the 
information gathered from the primary research to pro-
vide useful comparative information on these issues as 
the recommendations were drawn up.  The same four 
areas of interest (membership, governance, focus of 
activities, and funding) were reviewed over five similar 
organizations (The Community of Democracies, The 
Open Government Partnership, The Voluntary Prin-
ciples on Security and Human Rights, the Extractives 
Industry Transparency Initiative and the International 
Code of Conduct Association). 
Thirty interviews were carried out with government 
representatives from the Coalition, members of the Co-
alition working groups, and other external stakeholders 
not involved in the Coalition’s work.  Government 
representatives, civil society organizations, industry 
representatives, and academics were interviewed. 
The author was given the names of government rep-
resentatives and working group members by the FOC 
from which a list of interviewees was developed. Ten 
government representatives were interviewed and 
twenty non-government members, including four com-
pany representatives, seven from civil society, three 
academics and six Internet freedom experts who are 
not currently involved in the FOC’s work.
At the IGF, 14 people representing different stake-
holder groups attended a 90 minute focus group-like 
consultation and were asked the same set of ques-
tions. Government representatives were not present at 
the consultation in Brazil. 
The Center for Global Communications Studies at the 
University of Pennsylvania provided project support, 
methodological guidance, and editorial assistance. 
Methodology
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The first section of the questionnaire asked a series of 
general questions about motivation for joining the FOC, 
benefits of membership, successes and shortcomings 
of the organization, as well as the the FOC’s challeng-
es and opportunities. 
Reasons for Joining the Coalition 
and the Benefits of Membership
When government members were asked why they had 
joined the FOC, the most frequent response was a de-
sire to support the Internet freedom agenda in the face 
of restrictions to a free and open Internet that were be-
ing seen around the world.  
“In 2011, Internet freedom was already 
one of the top priorities for the Swed-
ish government. Trying to build a group 
on these issues that could be a stronger 
voice on an international level was a key 
motivation.” 
Frida Gustafsson, Attaché, Permanent Delegation 
of Sweden to the OECD and UNESCO
“The restrictions we were seeing being 
placed on the Internet in many parts of 
the world at the time were a key reason 
for it being established.” 
Stephen Lowe, Freedom of Expression Team Lead-
er, Human Rights and Democracy Department, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
“The Coalition brings together three 
 issues that are very important to Costa 
Rica: Human rights, the respect for free-
dom, and the Internet.” 
Mario Hernandez, official of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Costa Rica in the team for the Freedom 
Online Coalition
From the perspective of the Coalition’s government 
members, the most frequently mentioned benefit of 
membership was improved diplomatic coordination 
and the opportunity to work with like-minded govern-
ment partners to break through some of the traditional 
diplomatic blocks.  Because the Coalition’s structure 
combines member governments and the involvement 
of other stakeholders through the working groups and 
because the nature of diplomacy is often off the record, 
this benefit is largely invisible to those interviewees out-
side government and did not feature in their responses.
Other benefits that Government representatives high-
lighted included:
• Demonstrating to other parts of their own 
governments that it is possible to work 
constructively with other stakeholders, 
particularly civil society;
• Facilitating engagement with other parts 
of government on Internet freedom and its 
connectedness with other issues such as cyber 
security and national security;
• Raising the visibility of their government at 
international events such as the IGF;
• Using the Coalition as a valuable venue to talk 
about security and human rights concerns; 
• Facilitating the use of diplomatic channels to 
progress towards the 2012 Human Rights Council 
resolution regarding the same rights applying 
online that apply offline;
• Increasing knowledge within government of 
rapidly evolving technology and the potential 
implications for human rights.
“It has been a reasonably constructive 
space to discuss how we balance our 
need for national security with our hu-
man rights obligations.” 
Stephen Lowe, Freedom of Expression Team Lead-
er, Human Rights and Democracy Department, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
Findings
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“When we are talking about Internet 
freedom we can say we are working 
with a lot of other countries through the 
Freedom Online Coalition, so it is useful 
public diplomacy.” 
Australian government official
In contrast, when asked about the benefits of being 
involved in the FOC, non-governmental stakeholder re-
sponses were inflected differently. For example, these 
respondents appreciated the collective sharing of chal-
lenges among stakeholders, gaining insight into the 
way in which governments work on Internet freedom 
both publicly and privately, learning about dilemmas 
faced by companies, finding areas of common interest 
to work on, as well as the role the FOC working groups 
play in sustaining a global, multistakeholder conversa-
tion about Internet freedom. 
“There is a lot of US expertise on these 
issues among non-government stake-
holders so having people from other 
countries in the working groups helps 
that expertise to develop and also 
makes sure that voices and perspectives 
from other countries are included.” 
Stefan Heumann, Member of the management of 
Stiftung neue verantwortung
The FOC’s Successes
Respondents across all stakeholder groups most 
frequently cited the FOC’s creation of a space for 
government coordination and engagement on critical 
topics with other stakeholders through the working 
groups as a success.
Other successes cited include:
• The growing number of member states;
• The quality of the substance and discussion in 
the working groups;
• The fact that the annual conferences have been 
held in locations around the world, including the 
Global South;
• Opening up conversations on critical subjects 
and raising awareness of Internet freedom;
• Its uniqueness as a coalition of like-minded 
states;
• The Digital Defenders Partnership.
“The Tallinn Agenda makes it possible 
for companies operating in those mar-
kets to have a conversation about their 
commitments.” 
Patrik Hiselius, Senior Advisor, Digital Rights, 
 Teliasonera
 “One of their successes is that it cre-
ated a space for governments to have 
conversations when they didn’t have the 
forum or the space to do so.” 
Eduardo Bertoni, Global Clinical Professor, New 
York University, School of Law
FOC Shortcomings
A majority of respondents mentioned the lack of con-
crete deliverables and the difficulty in pointing to 
specific impacts the Coalition has had as shortcom-
ings. Common responses include:
• A lack of clarity on what the Coalition is and what 
it is trying to achieve;
• The challenge of pointing to tangible results and 
successes since the creation of the Coalition and 
the need to create clearer metrics to measure 
successes;
• The need for better external communication 
about the Coalition’s work;
• Poor senior level government attendance at the 
most recent FOC conferences.
Depending on the stakeholder affiliation of the respon-
dent, shortcomings were expressed differently. For 
example, government representatives were more likely 
to talk about the challenge of defining the FOC’s work 
post-Snowden, but other stakeholder groups were 
more likely to talk about hypocrisy and questioned 
whether signing up to the FOC commitments is making 
any tangible difference in member countries.
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Other shortcomings mentioned include:
• The relative weight of resources and institutional 
emphasis given to cyber security rather than 
Internet freedom within governments;
• The invisibility of the diplomatic work of the 
Coalition to those outside the FOC (including to 
members of the working groups);
• The lack of a significantly diverse global 
membership;
• The perceived inadequate response to the growth 
of restrictions on Internet freedom, including 
among FOC member countries; 
• The uneven capacity among member countries 
and its impact on active involvement in the 
Coalition;
• A lack of clarity on whether the principles of the 
Coalition are being followed by members and 
unclear consequences for membership if they 
are not;
• The slow pace of progress in the working groups 
(particularly in Working Group Two on Digital 
Development and Openness) and the creation of 
joint statements from the FOC.
“I’ve seen very little media coverage 
of anything the FOC does, and I think 
journalists who cover these things have 
probably not heard of the FOC. That is 
unfortunate.” 
Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital 
Rights at New America
“There’s a major tension point now with 
what the purpose of the FOC is. We have 
to figure out what we can all work on to-
gether in order to improve our goals.” 
Chris Riley, Head of Public Policy, Mozilla
Challenges and Opportunities 
for the FOC
Respondents registered both frustration and optimism 
when asked about challenges and opportunities for the 
FOC. Some were skeptical about its ability to achieve 
meaningful change but others were more optimistic 
that concrete achievements were just a matter of time, 
especially if the FOC actively confronts roadblocks 
such as the different levels of interest among member 
states. 
Other challenges identified included: 
• Broadening membership geographically;
• Keeping members engaged and committed to a 
strong set of principles;
• Creating greater clarity on the added value of the 
FOC and what it is trying to achieve;
• The discrepancy between what members of the 
FOC have committed to and what they do in 
practice;
• The need for some kind of accountability 
mechanism to address instances in which 
member governments are not meeting their 
Internet freedom commitments; 
• Developing specific indicators and measures of 
success;
• Recapturing credibility after the Snowden 
revelations;
• Ensuring that the people in the room have the 
 authority within their governments to make 
policy.
Opportunities:
• Promising growth in the membership of the 
Coalition and the opportunity to involve a broader 
range of governments in its mission;
• Building on the solid foundation that already 
exists among the working groups to deliver high 
quality, substantive outputs;
• Championing an online human rights framework 
through the establishment and promotion of best 
practices in Internet policy-making;
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• Facilitating honest discussion among members 
about the challenge of meeting FOC commitments 
in the present global environment;
• Creating something like the Universal Periodic 
Review to evaluate progress on member 
commitments;10
• Acting as a counterweight to the top down 
vision of Internet governance promoted by some 
authoritarian states;
• Developing a capacity-building model that offers 
added value to FOC members. 
“The FOC could potentially be a plat-
form through which best practices get 
established and promoted and that 
would be a very good thing…. I’ve seen 
some evidence of best practices be-
ing suggested by the working groups 
but I’m not seeing any evidence of best 
practices being implemented by gov-
ernments yet.” 
Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital 
Rights at New America
Membership of the Coalition11
Respondents were asked whether they thought other 
stakeholders should become full members of the Co-
alition. The majority of all interviewees (22) thought 
Coalition membership should continue to be gov-
ernment only. Two were supportive of making it a 
multistakeholder initiative and six either didn’t have a 
view or didn’t know.  Several people commented on 
the difficulty of having a firm view on this until there is 
greater clarity on the overall purpose of the Coalition. 
Some respondents, although supportive of the idea of 
retaining it as a government-only coalition, wanted to 
10 “Universal Periodic Review,” United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, last modified in 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx. 
11 The remaining parts in this section of the report break down the 
responses that were received on the four key areas of member-
ship, governance and structure, the focus of the activities of the 
FOC and finances. The number of respondents in this report 
is too small to meaningfully break out into percentages along 
the different stakeholder groups. Where there are particularly 
interesting differences in the responses between different stake-
holder groups these are pointed out.
see a greater link between the working groups and the 
FOC. 
Since its launch in 2011, the Coalition has grown from 
15 to 29 members. When asked about whether con-
tinuing to grow the membership of the Coalition was 
important, 17 respondents wanted to see a greater 
emphasis on the quality of membership rather than 
the quantity of members.  Once again, many respon-
dents said that this decision depends on more clarity 
about the purpose and objectives of the Coalition itself. 
Several respondents pointed out that it shouldn’t be a 
binary choice between growing the Coalition or not, but 
more about ensuring better geographic and regional 
membership of the Coalition in a way that does not 
negatively impact its principles. Ten respondents (six 
of them government respondents) were of the view that 
growing the membership should be the priority, and 
three respondents did not have an opinion on this topic.
 
“I would definitely go for a high bar 
rather than a universal approach. If 
you’re going to call it the Freedom On-
line Coalition then the goal should be to 
preserve freedom online and create cer-
tain conditions for membership.” 
David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the Pro-
motion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression
Many respondents did not have strong views on wheth-
er the current, fairly informal procedure to join the FOC 
should be made more formal. Thirteen (six of whom 
were government members) were in favor of adopting 
a more formal procedure, five were not in favor, and 12 
either had no view or didn’t know.  Many of the non-
government respondents were unaware of the current 
procedure. 
There was support for the idea of creating a tiered level 
of membership or some kind of observer status from 19 
respondents. Three were not supportive, and eight did 
not express an opinion. 
One of the key issues this evaluation addressed is 
whether membership in the FOC should entail ongoing 
commitments.  In the current model, once a govern-
ment has joined, there is a requirement to uphold the 
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though the Coalition is a voluntary, government-only 
organization, there was remarkable consensus among 
respondents that there ought to be a mechanism to ei-
ther suspend or remove members. 
“While there is desire to expand mem-
bership in the FOC to increase global 
awareness and support for freedom 
online, there should be a vehicle or 
mechanism for challenging members in 
their failure to live up to their commit-
ment.” 
Eileen Donohoe, Director of Global Affairs, Human 
Rights Watch
Some respondents had concerns about the practicality 
of implementing and enforcing these mechanisms. A 
contingent felt FOC members should be able to vote 
to remove members, but several pointed to the chal-
lenges of voting to remove members, given potential 
diplomatic issues that could arise.  One government 
representative suggested a connection between a 
periodic review and a reaffirmation of a government’s 
commitment to being a member of the Coalition ev-
ery few years. Several respondents wanted to see the 
same governance process for both joining the Coalition 
and potential removal or suspension of membership. 
Recommendations
• Keep the Coalition’s membership restricted 
to governments but review this in two to four 
years. At this stage, the FOC’s government-only 
composition is its uniqueness but, as its efforts 
progress, bringing stakeholders formally into 
the governance structure may make sense and 
should not be ruled out;
• Create a mechanism for a stakeholder from 
each working group to act as a liaison between 
the working group and FOC members.  This will 
help build trust and more open communication 
between the FOC and the working groups;
• Develop clearer membership criteria that 
explains the ongoing expectations for members 
and aids other stakeholders’ understanding 
these commitments;12 
12 For example, who is involved in the decision, and a publicly 
available process for applying. The application process should 
include a self-assessment from the applying Government on 
their current performance measured against the Coalition’s 
principles.
founding principles, but there is no mechanism of en-
forcement. There was almost unanimous support for 
some manner of standard, continued commitments for 
FOC members across all categories of respondents. 
Only two interviewees expressed reservations, largely 
around how practical it would be to introduce ongoing 
commitments at this stage. 
“I think there should be some sort of 
standard that members keep up to and 
some obligation that they should re-
spect and fulfill.” 
Mario Hernandez, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Costa Rica official on the Freedom Online Coalition 
team
Determining a set of commitments for FOC members is 
inextricably linked with the Coalition’s goals.  The core 
issue to be determined is whether the Coalition is an 
outward facing initiative seeking impact on the ground 
or a more inwardly focused organization concerned 
with monitoring the performance of members who 
have made a commitment to Internet freedom. Many 
participants in this evaluation thought the Coalition 
needed to establish a mechanism for demonstrat-
ing whether or not member governments are meeting 
their commitments. Interviewees most frequently cited 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) that takes place 
through the UN Human Rights Council as an example 
of how this might be done. The UPR could be used as 
the basis to develop a similar type of mechanism for 
the FOC. Alternatively, issues of Internet freedom al-
ready appear in the UPR process itself and it would be 
worth exploring the possibility of this being increased 
so that outcomes from the UPR could be part of the 
FOC mechanism.
A number of interviewees brought up the failure of 
some governments to play an active role in the Coali-
tion, citing the lack of participation from a number of 
governments at the 2015 annual FOC conference in 
Ulaanbaatar as an example. Lack of resources among 
some countries contributes to this issue, but respon-
dents felt there should be minimum requirements, 
including attendance at the annual conference, in order 
to be members in good standing of the FOC.    
Suspension or removal from the Coalition, and what 
(if anything) ought to trigger it, was the final section 
of the questionnaire’s section on membership. Even 
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• After the Coalition’s rapid growth, it should 
suspend new membership for a period of 12 
months to consider the other recommendations 
from this report and implement its response; 
• Institute minimum membership participation 
standards, such as participation in the annual 
conference; 
• Revisit the idea of an observer status for the 
Coalition within two years; 
• Create a mechanism for stakeholders to raise 
concerns about the performance of a particular 
Coalition member which includes the requirement 
for the member government to respond; 
• Over the longer term, create a review mechanism 
(possibly every three years) for Coalition 
members’ progress to be evaluated, using the 
Universal Periodic Review as a model. During the 
development of this mechanism, the Coalition 
will need to consider whether to introduce the 
potential suspension or removal of members.
Governance and Structure of the 
Coalition
Government respondents were asked a more detailed 
set of questions about the FOC’s day-to-day functioning. 
These focused on the role of the Chair, the Friends of 
the Chair and the Secretariat.
Many government interviewees felt a tension between 
the current informal arrangements for governance and 
the potential need to evolve into a more formal struc-
ture as the Coalition matures. 
When asked if there needed to be a more formal way 
of selecting the Chair, the majority of respondents 
(seven out of ten) were in favor of the current informal 
process. Currently, the Chair of the FOC hosts the an-
nual conference, and a number of respondents noted 
that this can be a burden on non-Western states with 
more limited resources, and is contradictory to the de-
sire among members to see more even participation 
among member states. Three people suggested the 
creation of a rotating Vice-Chair that would host the 
conference, easing the Chair’s burden. Nine of the ten 
government representatives interviewed thought that 
the development of terms of reference for the Friends 
of the Chair would be beneficial, particularly one which 
ensures continuity within the group and precludes a 
possible scenario where all members step down or ro-
tate at the same time.
In comparison, all five organizations whose structures 
were reviewed (see Annex B) have a more formal over-
all structure, including a board, board terms and the 
development of an overall governance framework. With 
the exception of the Open Government Partnership, 
however, the FOC is a much younger organization, 
which may help to explain this informality. 
The Secretariat
Global Partners Digital, a London-based social purpose 
company, currently provides the Secretariat support for 
the Coalition. This service is currently done on a one 
year contract basis. Government representatives were 
very complementary about the support they receive 
and the vital role that the Secretariat provides in keep-
ing the Coalition on track.
The questionnaire tailored to FOC government mem-
bers asked respondents their opinion about the 
establishment of a permanent Secretariat (all the 
comparative organizations reviewed have established 
one, with the exception of the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights – see Annex B).  There 
was provisional support from six government members 
for the creation of a permanent Secretariat, although 
many of those who supported the idea raised practical 
concerns such as the current lack of long-term funding 
for the Coalition, which would make the appointment 
of permanent staff challenging. Two respondents sup-
ported the current model and two were unclear as to 
what approach should be taken. 
There was unequivocal support for the current con-
tractual Secretariat arrangement to be reviewed on a 
regular basis if this model is retained (on a once every 
three-to-five year basis) and also for the competitive 
tendering of the contract.  Currently those governments 
that contribute financially to the working of the Coalition 
pay for the Secretariat, and one person thought that 
those who contribute financially should determine the 
choice of the Secretariat. 
On the whole, non-government stakeholders were not 
very familiar with the current arrangements, and of 
these, 12 expressed no view on the effectiveness of 
the governance structure of the Coalition.  Those who 
did express views did so mainly around improvements 
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that could be made to the working groups, such as en-
suring geographic diversity, and aligning stakeholder 
expectations with the outputs of the working groups. 
For example, it was mentioned that there needs to be 
clarity on whether/how the Coalition will consider the 
output from the working groups and whether it will im-
plement any recommendations.  
“There’s a kind of disconnect between 
the working groups and the Chair and 
Friends of the Chair at the Coalition that 
could be improved.” 
Lucy Purdon, ICT Project Manager, Institute for 
 Human Rights and Business
Recommendations
• Introduce a Vice-Chair role while retaining the 
current informal arrangements for the selection 
of Chair;
• Consider revising the role of Chair such that it 
provides strategic direction for the Coalition and 
the Vice-Chair hosts of the annual conference;
• Develop concise terms of reference for the 
Friends of the Chair group;
• Institute a multi-year contract for the Secretariat 
of the Coalition and competitively tender it with 
the understanding that the countries contributing 
financially to the Secretariat will get to make the 
final selection;
• Review the creation of a permanent Secretariat 
again when the FOC is more established; 
• Align stakeholder expectations and Coalition 
governance. Now that the Coalition has other 
stakeholders involved, it should create a formal 
link between the working groups’ outputs and the 
Coalition;
• Take under consideration whether the current 
consensus-decision making model could act as a 
barrier to implementation of the recommendations 
in this report.  A more formal structure may need 
to be developed to ensure decisions can be made 
when consensus cannot be achieved.
Coalition Efforts13
Interviewees for this project were asked to rate the 
importance of different efforts and activities of the Co-
alition with 1 being not at all important and 5 being very 
important.14  Notably, most activities have a relatively 
high score, with the exception of the publication of FOC 
statements and the side events at other conferences 
such as the IGF.  The FOC annual conferences were 
also not rated as highly by external stakeholders not 
currently involved in the Coalition.  
When asked about the future areas of focus for the 
FOC over the next few years, issues relating to ter-
rorism, security and openness, surveillance and the 
security of critical infrastructure and how this relates 
to Internet freedom were mentioned. In addition to 
continuing existing activities, respondents brought up 
working on normative standards at a regional level, 
beginning to issue government transparency reports, 
placing increased focus on diplomatic coordination, 
growing Global South membership, and being more 
outspoken about the actions of repressive regimes.
13 Respondents were asked to rate the following Coalition efforts: 
      The Digital Defenders Partnership – A fund administered by 
Hivos to help individuals and organizations working in the 
digital emergency field.
      The Annual Conferences held by the Coalition – Since its 
inception, the Coalition has held a conference once a year. 
So far, these have been held in The Hague, Tunis, Nairobi, 
Tallinn and Ulaanbaatar.
      The interchange of ideas and best practice within the Coalition 
      Attending other conferences such as the IGF – Delegates 
from the FOC now regularly attend events such as the IGF 
and RightsCon to discuss its work and hold consultations on 
specific issues on which the working groups are focused. 
      The opportunity to work with other stakeholders through
      the working groups – In 2013, three working groups were 
established that bring FOC members together with NGOs, 
industry, and academics. Each working group is co-chaired 
by a government representative and a stakeholder.
      Off the record meetings between the FOC and NGOs – 
These give FOC members the opportunity to hear about the 
state of Internet freedom in specific countries.
      Publication of FOC statements – The FOC has now issued 
a number of statements on specific issues setting out their 
position on Internet freedom.
      FOC work in regional networks e.g. HRC in Geneva and 
UNGA in New York – The FOC is now leveraging its contacts 
in New York and Geneva to put forward FOC positions on 
relevant resolutions.
14 In the interest of survey length, qualitative feedback about each 
activity or effort was not collected from the respondents. 
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Respondent Stakeholder Group
Coalition Activity NGO 
(7 respondents)
Academic 
(3 respondents)
Company
(4 respon-
dents)
Government 
(10 respondents)
External 
stakeholders 
not involved in 
Coalition 
(6 respondents)
Overall 
Average 
(30)
The opportunity to work with 
stakeholders in working groups
4.71 4.33 4.13 4.40 4.00 4.38
Internal exchange of best prac-
tice between FOC members
4.14 4.67 3.33 4.05 3.75 4.02
FOC Annual Conferences 3.57 4.00 5.00 4.35 2.75 3.98
Work with regional diplomatic 
networks e.g. United Nations 
General Assembly in New York 
and United Nations Human 
Rights Council  in Geneva
4.14 4.67 3.50 3.80 3.00 3.85
Digital Defenders  Partnership15 3.86 3.67 3.33 3.39 4.40 3.72
Off-the-record meetings with 
NGOs
4.00 3.67 3.00 3.80 3.33 3.73
Side events at conferences such 
as the IGF
3.86 3.67 3.13 3.60 2.75 3.48
Publication of FOC  statements 3.71 2.67 2.75 3.75 3.33 3.43
15  There was support for the Digital Defenders Partnership, but several respondents made the comment that they didn’t necessarily think it   
      needed to be connected to the FOC. 
“The Freedom Online Coalition should 
be part of the cutting edge conversa-
tions that are happening in the world, 
for example the privatization of gover-
nance. Governments have the primary 
responsibility for security but the pri-
vate sector owns the vast majority of 
critical infrastructure. This has huge im-
plications for free speech and privacy.” 
Eileen Donohoe, Director of Global Affairs, Human 
Rights Watch
“For the moment I think the Coalition 
should work on improving the internal 
structure, making the work more mean-
ingful and engage in more best practice 
discussions, improve the working groups 
and integrate them better into the out-
puts of the FOC.” 
Stefan Heumann, Member of the management of 
Stiftung neue verantwortung
Recommendations
• Significantly enhance the FOC’s sharing of 
internal best practices. This has the potential to 
offer real value to Coalition members, particularly 
those whose policies in the area of Internet 
freedom are less well developed;
• Develop a concise statement of goals and the 
ways in which the Coalition’s activities facilitate 
meeting these goals. This should include the role 
of other stakeholders involved in the work of the 
FOC.
Funding
The FOC’s current funding comes from voluntary 
contributions by member governments with additional 
funding from industry for specific activities such as the 
annual conference and travel support for civil society 
members. The FOC budget has evolved over the past 
five years as the Coalition activities have expanded and 
developed, and it has fluctuated according to individual 
member states’ available funds. When compared to the 
other organizations reviewed for this work that make 
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financial information available on their website, the 
FOC’s budget is considerably lower. 
All stakeholders were asked whether the FOC currently 
has sufficient money to meet its mandate and whether it 
should consider other sources of funding, for example, 
from foundations or industry. FOC members were also 
asked whether all governments should be required to 
make some financial contribution to the running of the 
Coalition.
Non-government interviewees were mostly not aware 
of the of the Coalition’s budget position (16 respondents 
answered ‘Don’t Know’ to the question of whether the 
FOC’s budget was sufficient to meet its mandate). 
Eight (of ten) government respondents felt the FOC’s 
funding was insufficient, and the two who felt it was 
sufficient noted that it was not stable. 
Eighteen respondents were in favor of other funding 
sources being considered, but for most of them, it 
was important that this be transparent, on a case-by- 
case basis, and for specific projects. The other ten 
respondents were of the fairly strong opinion that the 
Coalition should not receive outside sources of funding 
(two declined to offer their opinion), because it could 
effectively put governments in competition with civil 
society groups for limited external funding. 
“I think it would have to be very clear 
what is supported by the private sector 
but for specific activities I think there is 
value in exploring other possible fund-
ing.” 
Australian government official
FOC members were largely in favor (seven out of ten) 
of a financial contribution requirement from all member 
governments, but registered concern about it being a 
potential barrier to entry for developing nations. 
Recommendations
• Be more transparent about the finances of the 
FOC via the website;
• On a case-by-case basis, other funding sources 
could be sought for specific projects in a way 
that does not place the FOC in a position where it 
is competing for funds with civil society;
• Draft a public statement about the ways in which 
the FOC will approach funding which should 
include a commitment to funding the day-to-day 
activities solely through member contributions;
• A simple, tiered funding model should be 
developed for member countries, including a 
nominal contribution for developing nations. 
Within the tiered system there should be an 
option of no financial contribution in order to not 
disincentivize developing nation membership. 
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Conclusions
Recommendations 
Contention around some recommendations in this 
evaluation will be inevitable, and the current consensus 
decision-making model of the FOC could be a poten-
tial barrier to making necessary changes. The utility of 
this decision-making model needs to be considered as 
the Coalition works out its response to the report and 
implements its next steps. 
Clarifying the aims and objectives of the 
Coalition
Interviewees were vehement about the need to expli-
cate the aims and objectives of the Coalition given the 
many new activities the FOC has taken on in the last few 
years, the involvement of other stakeholders directly in 
its work, and the new reality following the Snowden rev-
elations. The lack of clarity makes it difficult to measure 
whether the FOC is meeting its mandate.  Clarifying 
the coalition’s intentions and function (including the in-
volvement of non-government representatives in the 
working groups) should begin immediately, followed by 
the development of an internal monitoring framework, 
complete with success indicators. The Foundation 
Declaration from the Hague Conference and the rec-
ommendations at the Tallinn Conference several years 
later lay out the fundamentals of the FOC’s work and 
can be used to create standards against which the 
FOC can be assessed.
Increasing accountability
Stakeholders need a mechanism whereby they can 
raise concerns about a member government. Creation 
of a light touch, preliminary model should be prioritized 
by the FOC and should include a requirement that the 
country of concern will respond to the issue.
Along these lines, the lack of consequences for 
members of the FOC who are not meeting their com-
mitments, or who have changed their approach to 
Internet freedom since becoming members, is a sig-
nificant concern. In contrast to the five organizations 
reviewed comparatively, although there is no common 
approach, they all stipulate expectations that have po-
tential consequences if they are violated. This is one of 
the most important areas for the Coalition to address. 
The FOC should consider introducing a special work-
Overall, the interviews conducted as part of this evalua-
tion revealed support for the existence of the Coalition, 
support for it remaining government only, strong sup-
port for the creation of the working groups and their 
potential added value, as well as confidence from gov-
ernment representatives in the Coalition’s outputs in 
the diplomatic arena. However, respondents frequently 
cited the need to sharpen the Coalition’s aims and ob-
jectives, clarify ongoing membership commitments and 
address accountability in terms of whether members 
are upholding those commitments. It is evident from 
their willingness to take part in this evaluation that re-
spondents are invested in the future successes of the 
Coalition, but there was substantial criticism of the 
Coalition to date from non-government respondents, 
particularly around plugging the gap between the work-
ing groups and the lack of tangible outcomes so far. 
Now in its fifth year, the FOC’s success is somewhat 
dependent on its ability to mature as an organization 
and take steps to increase its legitimacy through bet-
ter understanding of whether member commitments 
are being met. The involvement of other stakeholders 
in the Coalition through the working groups marks an 
important evolution in the trajectory of the FOC but it 
has also generated different expectations for the Coali-
tion’s accountability. It is vital that the Coalition address 
these concerns or the future active participation of oth-
er stakeholders may be at risk. 
The FOC has the opportunity to leverage its distinctive 
governmental composition and lead critically important 
conversations on how governments can live up to their 
Internet freedom commitments and objectives in the 
current complex environment. This will be difficult to 
do but has the potential to produce important concrete 
results. 
“The most important thing for me is 
an acknowledgement of tensions that 
have arisen and how to create the right 
incentives for deep engagement and 
collaboration.” 
Chris Riley, Head of Public Policy, Mozilla
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ing group to begin the introduction of a periodic review 
of members, along with a publicly available timeline for 
the implementation, which could include an acknowl-
edgment that it will take some time to develop. 
The current model is detrimental to its internal and ex-
ternal credibility. Minimum membership commitments 
should be developed, for example, attendance at the 
annual conference.
Developing the funding of the Coalition
The Coalition is funded mainly through the voluntary 
contributions of a handful of members. A tiered fee 
structure for membership of the Coalition should be 
introduced. Members should be encouraged to make 
a financial contribution, but it should be voluntary in 
order to not disincentivize the membership of states 
with fewer financial resources to join. 
Multi-year financial commitments from the FOC would 
enable an ongoing commitment to the Secretariat, 
and should be introduced. In the longer term, the 
FOC should consider whether it needs a permanent 
dedicated Secretariat. 
Improving governance
The involvement of other stakeholders in the working 
groups has complicated expectations among 
stakeholders. The interviews revealed a disconnection 
between the FOC and the working groups. The lack of 
clarity about the fate of work they produce is resulting in 
dissatisfaction among working group members. A more 
formalized link should be built into the governance 
structure with a commitment that the FOC will consider 
the output from working groups. 
Improving external communications
Diplomatic coordination is an important part of the 
Coalition’s work but it is not currently visible to anyone 
outside the FOC government members. Finding a way 
to address this through partially transparent measures, 
such as articulation of the different types of activities 
that take place, along with several examples that 
preserve confidentiality, would benefit the external 
validity and reputation of the Coalition.  
Many of the non-government stakeholders involved in 
this evaluation were not familiar with the governance 
processes of the Coalition, for example its funding 
situation or even the basic process by which 
governments join.  Some of the recommendations 
listed earlier in this report, such as creating clearer 
entry criteria, are the precursors to being able to 
communicate more effectively.
In closing
As a young organization, many of the challenges 
and concerns raised by those interviewed for this 
evaluation can be attributed to growing pains and the 
need for institutional maturity. However, this is not to 
say that the challenges faced by the FOC cannot also 
be attributed to what are now apparent structural flaws. 
Remediation of key governance issues, the creation 
of basic accountability mechanism for members, and 
clarity on what the Coalition is trying to achieve are 
essential. It is also critically important that the Coalition 
works to get itself onto firmer financial footing. 
There is hope that the FOC can be a real change-
making organization, given its unique composition 
of governments and the recent involvement of other 
stakeholders at the table. However, the FOC is current-
ly having trouble navigating the fraught post-Snowden 
landscape to place itself at the center of difficult con-
versations that need to be had, and where the Coalition 
could be exceptionally suited for action. Its challenge in 
the coming years is to do this. 
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Annex A
Full list of coalition members
(As of February 5, 2016)
Australia
Austria
Canada
Costa Rica
The Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Ireland
Japan
Kenya
Latvia
Lithuania
The Maldives
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
The Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Spain
Sweden
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States
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Annex B
Community of 
Democracies (CD)
Open Government 
Partnership (OGP)
International Code 
of Conduct on 
Private Security 
Service Provid-
ers Association 
(ICOCA)
Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human 
Rights (Voluntary Prin-
ciples)
Extractives Industry 
Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI)
MEMBERSHIP
What stake-
holder groups 
are members 
of the organiza-
tion?
CD is a government 
only coalition. Civil 
society, parliamen-
tarians, the private 
sector, youth, and 
academia are also 
involved in its work.
OGP is a govern-
ment coalition that 
involves civil society 
in its work. There are 
also partnerships with 
seven multilateral 
agencies including 
the World Bank, the 
Asia Development 
Bank, and the Orga-
nization for American 
States. 
ICOCA is a multi-
stakeholder organi-
zation with govern-
ments, companies 
and NGOs. Organi-
zations can also be 
observers. 
The Voluntary Principles is 
a multistakeholder model 
including governments, 
companies, and NGOs. 
There are also organiza-
tions that are observers of 
the Voluntary Principles. 
The EITI is a multi-
stakeholder coalition 
including govern-
ments, companies, 
NGOs, institutional 
investors, and partner 
organizations.
What is the 
size of the 
organization? 
106 governments 69 governments 6 governments, 14 
civil society orga-
nizations, over 700 
private security 
companies  
9 governments, 28 corpora-
tions, 10 NGOs
49 countries, over 90 
companies, 9 NGOs
When was the 
organization 
founded?
2000 2011 2010 2000 2003
What is the 
process for 
joining?
Prospective members 
will be evaluated 
based on their sup-
port for emerging and 
transitional democ-
racies, their par-
ticipation in the UN 
Democracy Caucus, 
designation of a se-
nior official to act as 
the point of contact, 
and tangible contribu-
tions to strengthening 
CD. 
There is a section on 
the website that ex-
plains the process for 
joining. This involves 
achieving a minimum 
level of  commitment 
to open govern-
ment in the areas of 
fiscal transparency, 
access to informa-
tion, income and 
asset disclosures and 
citizen engagement, 
submitting a letter of 
intent, and identifying 
a lead agency or min-
istry to develop the 
government action 
plan.  The website 
displays a spread-
sheet of the current 
status of member 
governments com-
pared to the eligibility 
criteria.
Organizations want-
ing to join submit an 
application that is re-
viewed by the Secre-
tariat with the Board 
making the decision 
on membership.  It is 
also possible to be an 
observer member of 
ICOCA. 
Applications are sent to the 
Secretariat and decisions 
on membership are made 
by the Steering Committee. 
There are several 
different processes 
for different 
stakeholders 
joining the EITI.  
Governments 
can either be 
implementing 
countries or 
supporting countries. 
There are different 
obligations for 
each. Companies, 
investors and NGOs 
indicate their interest 
in joining the EITI, 
to support the 
implementation of the 
EITI standards and 
consider a voluntary 
financial contribution.
Comparison of other organizations (based on their website information in January 2016)
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Community of 
Democracies (CD)
Open Government 
Partnership (OGP)
International Code 
of Conduct on 
Private Security 
Service Provid-
ers Association 
(ICOCA)
Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human 
Rights (Voluntary Prin-
ciples)
Extractives Industry 
Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI)
What are the 
commitments 
of member-
ship?
The commitments of 
CD members are set 
out in the Warsaw 
Declaration of 2000, 
which includes 19 
core democratic 
principles.    
Joining the OGP 
entails committing to 
the Open Govern-
ment Declaration 
of 2011, delivering 
a country action 
plan developed with 
public consultation, 
and committing to 
independent report-
ing on progress going 
forward. 
Joining ICOCA 
means committing to 
their code of conduct, 
and certification de-
pends on compliance 
with the code.
A set of principles articulate 
the steps member compa-
nies need to take to respect 
human rights while main-
taining the security and 
safety of their operations. 
The EITI is a global 
standard focused on 
the management of 
natural resources in 
an open and account-
able way. Countries 
are responsible for 
implementing the 
standards.
Is there a pro-
cess for remov-
ing members 
or assessing 
whether they 
are meeting 
their commit-
ments? If so, 
what triggers 
this?
The Council can 
suspend membership 
by consensus for 
unconstitutional inter-
ruption or deviation 
from the democratic 
process.
OGP has adopted 
a Response Policy 
to enable concerns 
about members to be 
raised. Responses 
to issues raised 
are made public 
through their website. 
Members are also 
required to produce 
a self-assessment 
report, which is also 
made public. 
ICOCA is a certifica-
tion model for com-
panies. This commits 
the companies to 
ongoing independent 
monitoring and evalu-
ation. Companies 
are also required to 
report regularly on 
their performance.  
There is a process in 
place for complaints 
to be raised and for 
companies to be sus-
pended if they have 
violated the code.
A government’s status in 
the Voluntary Principles 
will be reviewed if there is 
consensus in one constitu-
ency that the government 
is committing genocide, 
widespread or system-
atic war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.  There is 
no similar process for the 
review of either compa-
nies or NGOs, although 
NGOs must submit a letter 
each year requesting their 
continued involvement in 
the Voluntary Principles. 
The Voluntary Principles 
has a separate verification 
framework outlined for each 
type of member. 
Implementing coun-
tries are required to 
publish the revenue 
they receive and 
companies also pub-
lish figures to enable 
comparison between 
the two. Implement-
ing countries can be 
suspended from the 
EITI process. Two are 
currently suspended. 
STRUCTURE
What is the 
governance 
structure?
There is a Secretary 
General, a 28-country 
Governing Council 
and an International 
Steering Commit-
tee. An Executive 
Committee assists 
the Presidency which 
rotates between 
members of the Gov-
erning Council every 
two years.  
A Steering Commit-
tee oversees the de-
velopment of OGP’s 
work.  There are four 
co-chairs.  There are 
also 2 OGP ambas-
sadors.  
There is a Board of 
Directors with 12 
members and equal 
representation from 
all stakeholders. The 
General Assembly 
is a meeting of all 
members and takes 
place at least once 
a year. 
The Plenary is the Volun-
tary Principle’s decision 
making body and the 
Steering Committee is the 
main executive body of the 
Voluntary Principles. The 
Voluntary Principles Asso-
ciation addresses financial 
and administrative issues.
There is an indepen-
dent Board Chair and 
a Board of 20, with 
representation of dif-
ferent stakeholders. 
A conference is held 
every 3 years for all 
members. 
Is there a 
 Secretariat?
There is a perma-
nent Secretariat of 
7 plus the Secretary 
General.  
There is a permanent 
Secretariat of 14.
There is a permanent 
Secretariat of five.
The Secretariat for the 
Voluntary Principles is pro-
vided by the Washington, 
DC based law firm Foley 
Hoag.
There is a permanent 
Secretariat of 24.
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Community of 
Democracies (CD)
Open Government 
Partnership (OGP)
International Code 
of Conduct on 
Private Security 
Service Provid-
ers Association 
(ICOCA)
Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human 
Rights (Voluntary Prin-
ciples)
Extractives Industry 
Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI)
FOCUS OF ACTIVITIES
What are the 
key activities of 
the organiza-
tion?
Promoting democ-
racy and demo-
cratic values is done 
through working 
groups focused on 
a number of issues 
including governance 
and effectiveness, 
enabling civil society 
and improving elec-
toral practices. There 
are also initiatives 
relating to specific 
countries.  Ministerial 
conferences are held 
and there is capacity 
building work with 
civil society. The CD 
gives several awards 
and prizes, such as 
the Geremek Award. 
It also works to 
support transitional 
states (e.g. Tunisia) 
that have shown 
progress toward 
democracy via its 
“Democracy Partner-
ship” initiative.
The focus of their ac-
tivities is on advanc-
ing open government 
in member countries 
to benefit citizens.  
They achieve this 
by ensuring open 
government policy 
debates continue at 
the highest levels, 
supporting local 
reformers, fostering 
engagement with a 
wider range of stake-
holders and holding 
countries account-
able for the progress 
they are making in 
achieving their com-
mitments.
The ICOCA pro-
motes, governs, and 
oversees the ICOCA 
code. This includes 
providing certification 
for member compa-
nies that meet the 
standard; reporting, 
monitoring, and as-
sessing the perfor-
mance of member 
companies; and 
handling complaints 
that come in about 
member companies 
and potential viola-
tions of the code. 
The Voluntary Principles is 
focused on the extractives 
industry (oil, mining, and 
gas companies and related 
governments and NGOs). 
The principles embodied in 
the code, that companies 
respect human rights while 
securing their operations, 
form its core activities. The 
emphasis of work is on mu-
tual learning, best practice 
sharing, and joint problem 
solving with different stake-
holders. An annual plenary 
meeting takes place for all 
members. Each participant 
in the Voluntary Principles 
is required to submit an 
annual report detailing what 
they are doing to implement 
or support the implemen-
tation of the Voluntary 
Principles. 
Implementing the 
EITI standards is 
the key activity. This 
includes training and 
capacity building, 
validating the work 
of implementing 
countries, consider-
ing the applications 
of new countries, 
raising awareness of 
the standards, and 
publishing process 
and country reports. 
Work is currently 
underway to look at 
how the EITI can play 
a more active role 
in the public policy 
process. 
FINANCES
How is the 
organization 
financed?
There is no informa-
tion about the financ-
ing of the CD on their 
website.
Foundations, bilateral 
agencies and govern-
ments fund the OGP 
with occasional com-
pany contributions.
ICOCA is funded 
primarily by its 
members. Govern-
ment contributions 
are voluntary. It 
also receives fund-
ing from industry 
member dues and 
the one-time joining 
fee for applying 
members. Addition-
ally, the Government 
of Switzerland and 
the Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic 
Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF) make 
significant in-kind 
contributions.
The Voluntary Principles 
is financed by government 
and corporate member 
contributions.
Companies, govern-
ments, and devel-
opment agencies 
provide the funding. 
The majority of the 
funding comes from 
governments and de-
velopment agencies 
(62% in 2014).
What is the 
budget for the 
organization?
There is no informa-
tion about the budget 
of the CDs on their 
website. 
The OGP’s 2014 
revenue was $4.5 
million.
ICOCA’s 2016 budget 
is $1.1 million. 
There is no information 
about the budget of the 
Voluntary Principles on 
their website.
In 2014 the EITI’s 
revenue was $5 
million.
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Takeaways:
• Membership in each organization is based on a commitment to rights and principles. 
• In terms of basic structure, the Communities of Democracies, despite its massive size and extremely broad 
focus, is most similar to the FOC as a coalition of nation states that involves other stakeholders in its work. 
The Voluntary Principles, ICOCA, and EITI all have formal multistakeholder structures. The OGP also in-
volves civil society in the governance of its work. 
• All five organizations are more established and institutionalized than the Freedom Online Coalition. CD and 
EITI have been in existence for much longer. 
• They all have much more formal governance structures and with the exception of the Voluntary Principles, 
a permanent Secretariat. It is common to have a smaller steering committee or council for decision making 
independent of the full membership.
• All five organizations have significantly larger budgets and/or greater resources than the FOC.
• All of the comparable organizations have guidelines for continued membership and procedures for removal 
or suspension of non-compliant members.
• The goal of each organization drives the level of involvement of corporate and NGO partners. Organizations 
focused on the activities of companies (the Voluntary Principles and EITI) provide a much larger gover-
nance role for those stakeholders.  
• Particularly in those organizations where governments play a larger membership role, funding comes 
largely from partner governments. 
• Community of Democracies, due to its extremely broad focus and significant resources, may be hard to 
emulate, whereas OGP has comparably sized goals and focus to the FOC. 
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